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Abstract	
This	study	investigated	whether	young	children	accept	responsibility	for	the	
negative	actions	of	ingroup	members.		Five-year-old	children	watched	a	
transgressor	break	someone	else’s	valued	possession.		Depending	on	condition,	
this	transgressor	either	belonged	to	the	same	group	as	the	child	or	a	different	
group	from	the	child.		Coding	of	children’s	nonverbal	behaviour	indicated	that	
they	displayed	more	signs	of	guilt	(but	not	other	negative	emotions)	when	the	
transgressor	belonged	to	their	own	group	than	the	other	group.	Furthermore,	
when	the	transgressor	belonged	to	their	own	group,	children	were	more	likely	to	
say	that	their	own	group	should	apologise	for	the	damage	and	that	they	
themselves	should	try	to	repair	the	broken	object.		Children’s	connections	to	
their	groups	are	thus	so	profound	that	they	appear	to	feel	responsible	for	the	
negative	actions	of	their	group	members	even	when	they	had	no	personal	
involvement	in	the	harm	those	actions	caused.		
	
Key	words:	Collective	responsibility;	group	membership;	prosocial	behaviour;	
guilt	
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Do	young	children	accept	responsibility	for	the	negative	actions	of	ingroup	
members?		
1	Introduction	
Human	evolution	has	been	marked	by	an	ever-increasing	dependence	of	
individuals	on	one	another,	from	cooperative	foraging	to	group	defence		(Boyd,	
Richerson,	&	Henrich,	2011;	Brewer,	2007;	Tomasello,	Melis,	Tennie,	Wyman,	&	
Herrmann,	2013).		As	a	result	of	this	dependence,	individuals	feel	profound	
connections	to	their	social	groups.		These	connections	are	so	powerful	that	
individuals	are	often	willing	to	make	phenomenal	sacrifices	for	their	group	
members,	sometimes	even	being	willing	to	give	up	their	own	lives	to	protect	
them	(Swann,	Gomez,	Dovidio,	Hart,	&	Jetten,	2010).		Humans’	connections	to	
their	social	groups	also	have	a	darker	side,	however,	as	they	can	lead	to	
prejudice	and	discrimination	against	members	of	other	groups.	
The	depth	of	our	connections	to	our	social	groups	is	shown	very	strikingly	
in	emotions	such	as	collective	pride	and	collective	guilt.	Pride	and	guilt	are	
typically	thought	of	as	responses	to	individuals’	own	actions	(Lickel,	Schmader,	
Curtis,	Scarnier,	&	Ames,	2005).		The	experience	of	guilt,	for	example,	is	often	
conceptualized	as	an	aversive	emotion	that	follows	the	realization	that	one	has	
harmed	another	person	or	the	group	(Nelissen	&	Zeelenberg,	2009;	Tangney	&	
Dearing,	2002).		Research	in	social	psychology,	however,	has	demonstrated	that	
we	sometimes	report	feeling	guilty	for	the	negative	actions	of	our	ingroup	
members	when	we	played	no	personal	role	in	the	harm	those	actions	brought	
about.	
	 An	important	consequence	of	guilt	is	that	it	leads	us	to	accept	
responsibility	and,	in	doing	so,	seek	to	compensate	for	the	damage	that	has	been	
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caused	(de	Hooge,	Zeelenberg,	&	Breugelmans,	2007;	Ketelaar	&	Au,	2003;	Vaish,	
Carpenter,	&	Tomasello,	in	press).		Testing	the	consequences	of	collective	guilt,	
Doosje,	Branscombe,	Spears	and	Manstead	(1998)	asked	Dutch	adults	to	read	
either	an	unfavourable	description	of	their	country’s	imperial	past	(emphasising	
the	bloodshed	in	Indonesia	and	exploitation	of	labour)	or	a	favourable	
description	of	this	period	(emphasising	the	education	and	infrastructure	the	
Dutch	brought	to	the	area).		Participants	who	heard	the	unfavourable	
information	subsequently	tended	to	more	strongly	endorse	items	measuring	the	
extent	to	which	they	thought	they	and	the	Dutch	government	ought	to	
compensate	the	Indonesians	for	the	effects	of	colonialism.		
Accepting	responsibility	and	seeking	to	compensate	for	the	negative	
actions	of	ingroup	members	is	thought	to	serve	important	functions	in	human	
social	life.	For	example,	doing	so	can	reduce	the	probability	that	the	victims	will	
retaliate	against	the	individual	who	accepts	responsibility,	or	against	that	
individual’s	group	(Lickel,	Schmader,	&	Barquissau,	2004).	It	can	thus	reduce	the	
likelihood	that	intergroup	conflict	will	escalate	to	dangerous	levels	(Boehm,	
1984).	It	may,	therefore,	allow	for	the	regulation	of	group	life	in	a	similar	way	
that	the	acceptance	of	personal	responsibility	for	one’s	own	wrongdoing	allows	
for	the	regulation	of	more	intimate	relationships	(Lickel	et	al.,	2004).	
Despite	the	importance	of	collective	responsibility	to	our	understanding	
of	human	social	life,	relatively	little	is	known	about	this	phenomenon	in	young	
children.	Certainly,	the	origins	of	intergroup	bias	appear	very	early	in	
development.		Even	infants	prefer	to	learn	and	take	toys	from	individuals	who	
speak	their	own	language	than	from	individuals	who	speak	a	different	language	
(Buttelmann,	Zmyj,	Daum,	&	Carpenter,	2013;	Kinzler,	Dupoux,	&	Spelke,	2007).		
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Older	children	are	able	to	accurately	categorise	themselves	as	belonging	to	some	
groups	and	not	others	(e.g.,	Aboud,	1987;	2001;	Bennett	&	Sani,	2008)	and	
explicitly	prefer	members	of	their	own	group,	even	when	those	groups	are	
artificially	created	in	the	lab	(e.g.,	Dunham,	Baron,	&	Carey,	2011).			
The	developmental	foundations	of	collective	responsibility,	however,	
have	not	yet	been	widely	investigated.	What	is	reasonably	well	established	is	
that	by	around	the	age	of	two	or	three	years,	children	tend	to	accept	
responsibility	for	damage	they	have	caused	themselves	and	try	to	repair	it	(e.g.,	
Barrett,	Zahn-Waxler,	&	Cole,	1993;	Kochanska,	Gross,	Lin,	&	Nichols,	2002;	
Vaish	et	al.,	in	press).	However,	to	our	knowledge,	only	one	study	so	far	has	
investigated	children’s	tendency	to	accept	collective	responsibility.		Bennett	and	
Sani	(2008)	mention	a	study	that	was	designed	to	test	whether	children	accept	
responsibility	for	the	negative	actions	of	their	ingroup	members.		The	authors	
asked	5-,	7-	and	9-year-old	children	to	imagine	a	scenario	in	which	either	they	
themselves	or	someone	else	from	their	school	broke	a	window	at	another	school.		
Results	showed	that	the	7-	and	9-year-old	children	reported	that	they	would	
want	to	apologise	in	both	cases.	Five-year-olds,	on	the	other	hand,	reported	that	
they	would	only	want	to	apologise	when	they	themselves	had	broken	the	
window.		Although	these	results	are	suggestive,	they	are	difficult	to	interpret	for	
two	reasons.	First,	the	argument	that	older	children	accept	collective	
responsibility	is	based	on	a	null	result	-	these	children’s	responses	did	not	differ	
when	they	were	asked	about	themselves	and	when	they	were	asked	about	an	
ingroup	member.	Second,	and	relatedly,	in	order	to	make	the	argument	that	
children	accept	responsibility	for	the	actions	of	their	ingroup	members,	it	is	
critical	to	show	not	only	that	they	accept	responsibility	for	their	ingroup	
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members’	negative	actions	but	also	that	they	accept	responsibility	more	often	for	
the	negative	actions	of	ingroup	members	than	for	the	negative	actions	of	
outgroup	members.		Bennett	and	Sani’s	results	leave	open	the	possibility	that	the	
older	children	did	not	accept	collective	responsibility	for	ingroup	member’s	
actions,	but	rather	that	they	had	learned	to	apologise	more	often	and	in	more	
situations	than	younger	children	regardless	of	who	performed	the	negative	
action.	
In	the	present	study,	we	built	on	this	previous	research	in	order	to	
investigate	whether	children	are	more	likely	to	accept	responsibility	for	the	
negative	actions	of	ingroup	members	than	for	the	negative	actions	of	outgroup	
members.	In	order	to	do	this,	we	created	a	scenario	in	which	a	valued	object	was	
broken	either	by	the	child’s	ingroup	member	or	the	child’s	outgroup	member.		
We	then	investigated	children’s	acceptance	of	collective	responsibility	through	a	
number	of	different	measures.		First,	we	coded	children’s	displays	of	emotion.	
We	predicted	that	children	would	display	more	signs	of	guilt	when	the	valued	
object	had	been	broken	by	an	ingroup	member.		In	order	to	ensure	that	the	
effects	were	specific	to	guilt,	we	also	coded	children’s	displays	of	other	negative	
emotions,	more	specifically,	embarrassment,	sadness	and	fear.		We	predicted	
that	displays	of	these	other	negative	emotions	would	not	differ	between	
conditions.	Next,	we	asked	children	two	explicit	questions	relating	to	repairing	
the	damage	caused	by	the	negative	event.		The	first	question	we	asked	children	
was	who	should	apologise	for	the	negative	event	–	their	own	group	or	the	other	
group.		This	question	was	designed	to	check	whether	children	understood	the	
general	situation	and	were	able	to	answer	questions	about	group	level	
responsibility.		We	predicted	that	children	would	be	significantly	more	likely	to	
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answer	that	their	own	group	should	apologize	when	the	object	was	broken	by	an	
ingroup	member.	The	second	question	we	asked	children	was	who	should	try	to	
repair	the	broken	object,	themselves	or	an	individual	from	the	other	group.		This	
second	question	was	an	important	addition	because	neither	individual	actually	
broke	the	object.		We	predicted	that	children	would	report	that	they	themselves	
ought	to	repair	the	object	more	often	when	it	was	broken	by	an	ingroup	member	
than	an	outgroup	member.		Finally,	we	also	investigated	whether	children	would	
be	more	likely	to	spontaneously	try	to	repair	the	object	when	it	had	been	broken	
by	a	member	of	their	own	group.		
We	chose	to	investigate	these	questions	with	five-year-old	children	rather	
than	the	somewhat	older	children	who	showed	signs	of	collective	responsibility	
in	Bennett	and	Sani’s	(2008)	study.		We	reasoned	that,	by	creating	a	situation	in	
which	a	valued	object	was	actually	broken,	rather	than	using	a	hypothetical	
scenario,	we	might	be	able	to	detect	signs	of	collective	responsibility	even	in	
these	younger	children.		Many	of	the	pre-requisites	for	collective	responsibility	
seem	to	be	in	place	by	five	years	of	age:	we	know	from	previous	research	that	
children	of	this	age	categorise	themselves	as	belonging	to	some	groups	and	not	
others	(Aboud,	2001)	and	that	they	are	sensitive	to	even	artificially	created	
groups	(e.g.,	Dunham	et	al.,	2011;	Nesdale	&	Flesser,	2001;	Engelmann,	Over,	
Herrmann,	&	Tomasello,	2013).	Moreover,	by	this	age,	children	accept	
responsibility	for	their	own	negative	actions	in	interpersonal	contexts	and	
recognize	and	value	the	acceptance	of	responsibility	in	others	(Kochanska	et	al.,	
2002;	Vaish,	Carpenter,	&	Tomasello,	2011,	in	press).		
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2.	Method	
2.1	Participants	
Participants	were	74	five-year-olds	(mean	age	5	years,	6	months,	age	range	5	
years,	3	months	–	5	years,	9	months;	35	females).	Thirty-nine	of	these	children	
were	in	the	Ingroup	condition	and	35	were	in	the	Outgroup	condition.	A	further	
4	children	were	tested	but	dropped	from	analysis	as	a	result	of	experimenter	
error	(1),	equipment	failure	(1)	or	successfully	repairing	the	doll	before	the	test	
phase	(2).		Children	were	recruited	from	and	tested	in	their	kindergartens	in	a	
mid-sized	town	in	Germany.			
	
2.2	Materials	and	characters	
The	materials	for	the	group	manipulation	consisted	of	four	armbands	and	
scarves	(two	yellow	and	two	green),	and	two	musical	boxes	(one	yellow	and	one	
green).		The	musical	boxes	could	be	made	to	produce	sounds	by	throwing	
marbles	down	a	long	chute	such	that	they	rolled	onto	a	glockenspiel	fastened	to	
the	inside	of	the	box.	The	materials	for	the	breaking	event	consisted	of	a	doll	that	
had	been	modified	in	such	a	way	that	the	head	fell	off	(remaining	attached	to	the	
body	with	a	few	strands	of	wool)	when	it	was	lightly	shaken	(see	Figure	1;	cf.	
Kochanska,	Casey,	&	Fukumoto,	1995).		
Testing	was	conducted	by	three	female	experimenters.		These	
experimenters	operated	four	animal	puppets,	and	it	was	these	four	animal	
puppets	that	formed	the	main	characters	in	the	experiment.		The	characters	
were:	a	transgressor,	a	victim,	an	outgroup	member,	and	an	extra	puppet	(see	
Table	1).		In	addition	to	these	four	characters,	one	of	the	experimenters	acted	as	
a	moderator,	introducing	the	games	and	asking	the	test	questions.		
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Figure	1.	Photographs	of	the	doll	intact	(left)	and	broken	(right)	
	
	
Table	1.	The	experimental	roles.		
Puppet	
name	
Puppet	role	 Description	of	role	
Group	
membership	
Operated	by	
Ape	 Transgressor	 Broke	the	doll	
Dependent	on	
condition	
Experimenter	1	
Teddy	 Victim	 Owned	the	doll	broken	by	the	ape	 None	 Moderator	
Cow	 Outgroup	
Served	as	the	comparison	point	for	the	
test	questions	
Child’s	
outgroup	
Dependent	on	
condition	
Fox	 Extra		 Evened	up	the	numbers	in	the	two	groups	
Dependent	on	
condition	
Experimenter	2	
	
	
2.3	Design	and	counterbalancing	
The	study	had	a	between-subjects	design	with	two	conditions:	Ingroup	and	
Outgroup.	Children	in	both	conditions	watched	the	transgressor	break	the	
victim’s	precious	doll.		What	varied	between	conditions	was	the	group	to	which	
the	transgressor	belonged:	for	approximately	half	of	children,	the	transgressor	
belonged	to	the	same	group	as	them	and,	for	the	other	half	of	children,	the	
transgressor	belonged	to	a	different	group	from	them.		The	group	to	which	the	
child	and	the	puppets	belonged	(Yellow	or	Green)	was	manipulated	through	the	
use	of	group	markers	and	a	brief	turn-taking	game.		
Following	the	breaking	event,	there	was	a	brief	period	(lasting	
approximately	40	seconds)	after	the	doll	broke	and	before	the	moderator	
noticed	and	commented	on	the	broken	doll.		This	period	was	used	to	code	(from	
	 10	
video)	how	many	signs	of	guilt	and	other	negative	emotions	children	displayed.		
We	asked	two	raters,	who	were	unaware	of	the	hypotheses	of	the	study,	to	watch	
the	videos	and	code	how	guilty,	embarrassed,	sad	and	afraid	they	thought	each	
child	felt	by	looking	at	their	nonverbal	behaviour.		
Following	this	period,	we	asked	children	two	explicit	questions.		In	a	
preliminary	question,	we	asked	children	which	group	should	apologise,	the	
Yellow	group	or	the	Green	group.		Following	this,	we	asked	children	who	should	
try	to	repair	the	doll,	themselves	or	someone	from	the	other	group	(note	that	
neither	the	child	nor	this	other	individual	actually	broke	the	doll).	After	these	
two	questions	had	been	asked,	we	also	measured	how	many	children	attempted	
to	repair	the	doll.		
The	colour	of	the	group	to	which	children	were	allocated	(Yellow	or	
Green)	and	the	position	of	the	transgressor	and	outgroup	puppets	(to	the	right	
or	left	of	children)	were	counterbalanced.	Approximately	the	same	number	of	
boys	and	girls	participated	in	each	condition.		
	
2.4	Procedure	
The	moderator	invited	the	child	into	a	quiet	room	in	his	or	her	kindergarten	and	
introduced	him	or	her	to	the	transgressor,	outgroup,	and	extra	puppet.1		Once	
the	child	was	sitting	comfortably	at	the	table	with	the	three	puppets,	the	
moderator	introduced	the	group	manipulation	by	saying	‘And	now	we’re	all	
going	to	play	something	and	for	that,	we	need	two	groups:	a	Yellow	group	and	a	
Green	group’.	The	moderator	then	appeared	to	randomly	allocate	the	child	to	
																																																								
1	Although	each	of	these	puppets	were	referred	to	by	their	names,	we	refer	to	them	here	by	their	
role	in	the	experiment	in	order	to	make	the	procedure	easier	to	follow.	
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one	of	the	two	groups	(the	Yellow	group	or	the	Green	group)	by	asking	them	to	
choose	one	of	two	counters	from	her	closed	hands	(though	in	fact,	the	group	that	
the	child	was	allocated	to	was	decided	prior	to	testing	and	so	both	counters	in	
the	moderator’s	hands	were	of	the	same	colour).			
What	happened	next	varied	according	to	condition.		In	the	Ingroup	
condition,	the	moderator	allocated	the	transgressor	to	the	same	group	as	the	
child	and	the	extra	puppet	to	the	other	group	from	the	child.		In	the	Outgroup	
condition,	the	moderator	allocated	the	transgressor	to	the	other	group	from	the	
child,	and	the	extra	puppet	to	the	same	group	as	the	child.		The	Outgroup	puppet	
was	always	allocated	to	the	other	group	from	the	child.	Thus,	in	both	conditions,	
the	Yellow	group	and	the	Green	group	each	had	two	members.		
Following	the	group	allocation,	to	reinforce	the	salience	of	the	groups,	the	
child	and	the	other	member	of	his	or	her	group	were	given	scarves	and	
armbands	matching	the	colour	of	the	group	to	which	they	had	been	assigned.		
The	moderator	then	introduced	one	of	the	musical	boxes	(which	also	matched	
the	colour	of	the	child’s	group),	and	explained	how	the	child	and	the	other	
member	of	their	group	could	operate	it	together.		The	child	and	his	or	her	group	
member	(the	transgressor	in	the	Ingroup	condition	and	the	extra	puppet	in	the	
Outgroup	condition)	then	took	turns	making	the	musical	box	function	by	
throwing	marbles	down	the	chute.		During	this	game,	the	group	member	
commented	that	she	liked	being	in	the	same	group	as	the	child.		
Following	this,	the	members	of	the	other	group	were	given	their	scarves	
and	armbands	and	introduced	to	the	second	musical	box	(all	of	which	matched	
the	colour	of	their	group).	The	two	members	of	the	other	group	then	played	with	
the	musical	box	in	same	way	as	the	child	and	his	or	her	group	member	had	done	
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and	commented	that	they	liked	being	in	a	group	together.	These	playful,	turn-
taking	interactions	were	designed	to	enhance	the	importance	of	the	groups	to	
children	and	to	set	up	the	context	for	the	later	breaking	event.	
	 Once	the	two	groups	had	completed	their	games,	the	moderator	said	she	
wanted	everyone	to	meet	Teddy	and	introduced	them	to	the	victim	puppet.		The	
victim	puppet	appeared	from	under	the	table	and	introduced	himself	to	the	two	
groups.		He	then	announced	that	he	wanted	to	show	the	two	groups	his	favourite	
doll,	and	fetched	it	from	under	the	table.		The	victim	lay	this	doll	on	the	table	and	
spent	approximately	45	seconds	pointing	out	various	features	of	the	doll	and	
explaining	to	the	two	groups	how	much	he	loved	it.		During	this	period,	he	
pointed	out	that	the	doll	was	holding	a	marble	in	a	small	bag.		Once	he	had	
finished	describing	the	doll,	the	victim	announced	that	he	had	to	leave	but	that	
he	would	leave	his	beautiful	doll	in	the	middle	of	the	table.		He	then	placed	the	
doll	midway	between	the	two	groups,	and	told	them	that	they	could	play	more	
and	that	he	would	see	them	later.		After	he	said	this,	he	disappeared	under	the	
table.		
	 At	this	point,	the	puppets	from	the	two	groups	brought	out	their	musical	
boxes	once	more.		The	transgressor	then	looked	around	the	table	and	pointed	
out	that	there	were	no	more	marbles	for	his	group	to	throw	into	the	musical	box.		
He	then	appeared	to	notice	the	doll	and	said	that	he	would	take	the	doll’s	marble	
for	his	group.	The	transgressor	then	moved	towards	the	doll	and	attempted	to	
dislodge	the	marble	from	the	doll’s	hand.	In	doing	so,	he	broke	the	doll	and	let	
out	a	small	gasp,	saying	‘Oh	the	doll’	in	a	sad	voice.	Following	the	breaking	event,	
he	alternated	his	gaze	twice	between	the	broken	doll	and	the	child’s	face.	The	
transgressor	and	the	extra	puppet	then	disappeared	from	the	scene,	moving	back	
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from	the	table	slowly	and	without	comment.	This	left	the	child	and	the	Outgroup	
puppet	at	the	table.		
	 The	moderator	then	returned	to	the	interaction	and	removed	the	two	
musical	boxes	from	the	table.	Once	she	had	cleared	the	table,	she	appeared	to	
notice	the	broken	doll.		She	picked	it	up	and	talked	briefly	about	how	sad	the	
victim	would	be	that	his	doll	was	broken.	The	moderator	then	addressed	the	
child	and	the	Outgroup	puppet	and	asked	who	should	apologise	to	the	victim,	the	
Yellow	group	or	the	Green	group.	If	the	child	did	not	reply,	the	moderator	
addressed	the	question	directly	to	the	child,	asking	again	who	should	apologise,	
the	Yellow	group	or	the	Green	group.	Once	the	child	had	answered	this	question,	
or	it	was	clear	that	he	or	she	would	not	answer,	the	moderator	mentioned	that	
someone	from	one	of	the	two	groups	had	broken	the	doll	and	suggested	that	
perhaps	someone	ought	to	try	and	fix	it.		She	then	addressed	the	child	and	the	
Outgroup	puppet	again	and	asked	who	should	try	to	repair	the	doll.		If	the	child	
did	not	answer,	she	addressed	the	child	directly	and	asked	who	should	try	to	
repair	the	doll,	them	or	the	Outgroup	puppet.	Once	the	child	had	answered,	or	it	
was	clear	that	he	or	she	would	not	answer,	the	moderator	said	‘Hmm’	and	
absent-mindedly	brought	out	something	to	read,	pushing	the	doll	into	the	centre	
of	the	table	as	she	did	so.	The	next	30	seconds,	while	the	moderator	read,	gave	
the	child	the	opportunity	to	try	to	repair	the	doll	him-	or	herself.		During	this	
time,	the	Outgroup	puppet	was	present	but	inactive.	
	 After	these	30	seconds,	the	experiment	was	complete.		The	transgressor	
and	the	extra	puppet	now	re-emerged.	In	order	to	model	positive	behaviour	to	
the	child	and	to	ensure	that	he	or	she	was	not	upset	by	the	breaking	event,	the	
transgressor	puppet	apologised	for	breaking	the	doll	and	explained	that	it	had	
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been	an	accident.		The	moderator	accepted	his	apology	and	said	that	once	she	
explained	everything	to	the	victim,	he	would	not	be	upset.	The	three	puppets	at	
the	table	then	worked	together	with	the	moderator	to	repair	the	doll.		The	child	
was	thanked	for	his	or	her	participation	and	taken	back	to	his	or	her	classroom.		
	
2.5	Coding	
Children’s	emotional	displays	were	coded	from	video	by	two	independent	raters	
who	were	unaware	of	the	hypotheses	of	the	study.	For	each	child,	the	raters	
were	asked	to	indicate	on	five-point	scales	(ranging	from	1	‘does	not	feel	at	all…’	
to	5	‘feels	extremely…’)	how	guilty,	embarrassed,	sad	and	afraid	the	child	
appeared	to	feel.		Thus	high	scores	on	this	scale	indicated	greater	displays	of	
emotion.		Guilty	was	defined	for	the	raters	as	‘The	child	looks	as	if	they	think	
they	have	done	something	wrong	and	caused	someone	else	harm’.	Embarrassed	
was	defined	as	‘The	child	looks	as	if	they	think	they	have	done	something	silly	
that	someone	else	might	laugh	at’.		Sad	was	defined	as	‘The	child	looks	as	if	
someone	said	something	hurtful	to	them	or	they	lost	their	favorite	toy’	and	afraid	
was	defined	as	‘The	child	looks	as	if	they	have	seen	or	experienced	something	
scary’.		The	two	raters’	estimates	of	the	emotions	were	all	positively	and	
significantly	correlated	(guilt:		r(N=72)=.526,	p<.001,	embarrassment:	
r(71)=.393,	p=.001,	sadness:	r(71)=.378,	p=.001,	fear:	r(71)=.324,	p=.006).		The	
responses	of	the	two	raters	were	averaged	to	create	single	scores	for	the	four	
emotions.			
Children’s	responses	to	the	explicit	questions	and	the	repair	measure	
were	coded	live	by	the	experimenters.		For	the	first	question	(about	which	group	
ought	to	apologize),	children’s	responses	were	coded	as	referring	to	either	the	
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ingroup	or	the	outgroup.		For	the	second	question	(about	who	ought	to	repair	
the	doll),	children’s	responses	were	coded	as	referring	either	to	themselves	or	to	
the	Outgroup	puppet.		A	few	children	failed	to	provide	a	response	or	provided	
some	other	response	in	which	case	their	data	were	not	included	in	the	analyses	
for	that	item.		Attempts	to	repair	were	coded	if	children	contacted	the	doll	and	
made	at	least	one	attempt	to	bring	the	two	broken	parts	together.		
For	the	explicit	questions	and	the	repair	measure,	data	from	16	children	
were	also	second	coded	from	video	by	a	rater	who	was	unaware	of	the	
hypotheses	of	the	experiment.		Agreement	between	the	two	coders	was	perfect	
for	the	two	explicit	questions	(Kappas=1),	with	only	one	disagreement	for	
whether	children	attempted	to	repair	the	doll	themselves	(Kappa=.875).		
	
3.	Results	
3.1.	Nonverbal	displays	of	emotion	
	 Two	children	(both	in	the	Ingroup	condition)	could	not	be	included	in	
these	analyses	because	their	faces	were	not	visible	on	the	camera,	as	they	were	
obstructed	by	the	experimental	apparatus.		Analyses	of	the	remaining	72	
children’s	nonverbal	behaviour	indicated	that	of	the	four	negative	emotions	
coded,	children	only	displayed	guilt	differently	across	conditions.	Specifically,	
children	displayed	significantly	more	signs	of	guilt	in	the	Ingroup	condition	than	
in	the	Outgroup	condition	t(70)=2.86,	p=.006,	Cohen’s	d=.66	(see	Table	2).	
Children’s	displays	of	embarrassment	(t(70)=-1.73,	p=.09),	sadness	(t(70)=1.24,	
p=.22)	and	fear	(t(70)=.648,	p=.22)	did	not	differ	between	conditions.			
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Table	2.	Children’s	nonverbal	displays	of	emotion.		
		 Ingroup	condition	 Outgroup	condition	
Emotion	 Mean	 Standard	deviation	 Mean	 Standard	deviation	
Guilt	 2.15	 0.85	 1.6	 0.77	
Embarrassment		 2.05	 0.9	 2.4	 0.79	
Sadness	 2.07	 0.83	 1.83	 0.8	
Fear	 1.61	 0.79	 1.5	 0.61	
	
Note.	Statistically	significant	differences	between	the	conditions	are	highlighted	
in	bold.		
	
3.2	Responses	to	the	explicit	questions	
Thirty-four	children	in	the	Ingroup	condition	provided	an	answer	to	the	
question	about	which	group	ought	to	apologise.	Of	these,	31	answered	that	their	
own	group	ought	to	apologise	and	3	answered	that	the	other	group	should	
apologise.		In	the	Outgroup	condition,	34	children	provided	an	answer	and	all	of	
them	answered	that	the	other	group	should	apologise.		This	difference	between	
conditions	is	significant,	X2(1,	N=68)=56.97,	p<.001,	r2=.92.		Thus,	children	
understood	which	group	the	transgressor	belonged	to	and	were	able	to	answer	
questions	about	group	level	responsibility.		
Thirty-six	children	in	the	Ingroup	condition	provided	an	answer	to	the	
question	about	who	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	doll.	Of	these,	26	answered	that	
they	themselves	should	attempt	to	repair	the	doll	and	10	answered	that	the	
Outgroup	member	should	try	to	repair	the	doll.		In	the	Outgroup	condition,	33	
children	provided	an	answer	to	the	question	about	who	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	
doll.		Of	these,	16	children	answered	that	they	themselves	ought	to	try	to	repair	
the	doll	and	17	answered	that	the	Outgroup	member	should	try	to	repair	the	doll	
(see	Figure	2).		This	difference	between	conditions	is	significant,	X2(1,	N	
=69)=4.07,	p=.044,	r2=.24.	Thus,	children	are	relatively	more	likely	to	report	that	
they	should	repair	the	damage	caused	by	members	of	their	own	group	than	the	
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damage	caused	by	members	of	other	groups.			Note	that	no	child	answered	this	
question	by	referring	to	either	of	the	groups.			
	
Figure	2.	Children’s	verbal	responses	to	the	question	regarding	who	ought	to	try	
to	repair	the	doll	in	the	two	conditions.		
	
3.3	Attempts	to	repair	the	doll	
	 There	was	no	difference	between	conditions	in	the	number	of	children	
who	attempted	to	repair	the	doll.		In	the	Ingroup	condition,	19	children	
attempted	to	repair	the	doll	and	in	the	Outgroup	condition,	15	attempted	to	
repair	the	doll,	X2(1,	N=74)=.26	p=.61		
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3.4	Relations	between	the	measures	
In	order	to	determine	whether	non-verbal	displays	of	guilt	were	
correlated	with	children’s	verbal	responses	and	attempts	to	help,	we	first	
created	an	aggregate	measure	of	children’s	responses	to	the	two	explicit	
questions	and	the	repair	measure,	with	each	of	the	three	measures	worth	1	
point.		Children’s	scores	on	this	aggregate	measure	could	thus	range	between	0	
(if	they	gave	no	responses	indicating	guilt)	and	3	if	they	gave	responses	that	
indicated	guilt	on	all	three	measures.	(Children	who	failed	to	answer	one	or	both	
of	the	explicit	questions	were	not	included	in	these	analyses).		Children’s	
nonverbal	displays	of	guilt	were	positively	and	significantly	correlated	with	this	
aggregate	measure,	rho(62)=.272,	p=.033,	suggesting	that	the	more	signs	of	guilt	
children	displayed,	the	more	they	subsequently	accepted	responsibility.		
Importantly,	children’s	nonverbal	displays	of	embarrassment,	sadness	and	fear	
did	not	significantly	predict	their	aggregate	scores	on	this	measure	
(embarrassment:	rho(62)=-.206,	p=.108,	sadness:	rho(62)=.048,	p=.711,	fear:	
rho(62)=.199,	p=.121).		
	
4.	Discussion	
This	experiment	was	designed	to	investigate	whether	five-year-old	children	
accept	responsibility	for	the	negative	actions	of	their	ingroup	members.		Results	
from	the	coding	of	children’s	nonverbal	behaviour	suggest	that	they	displayed	
significantly	more	signs	of	guilt	when	a	member	of	their	own	group	had	
committed	a	transgression	than	when	a	member	of	the	other	group	had	
committed	a	transgression.		These	negative	emotional	displays	appear	to	be	
specific	to	guilt.	Children	did	not	differ	in	their	displays	of	fear,	suggesting	that	
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the	differences	between	conditions	on	the	other	measures	cannot	be	explained	
by	fear	of	negative	consequences	for	their	own	group.	Nor	can	they	be	explained	
by	sadness	at	the	ingroup’s	transgression,	because	displays	of	sadness	did	not	
differ	between	the	conditions.		Finally,	displays	of	embarrassment	were	similar	
in	the	two	conditions,	further	underlining	that	the	manipulation	specifically	
affected	guilt	rather	than	other	negative	social	emotions.		
Children’s	answers	to	the	two	explicit	questions	add	further	weight	to	the	
claim	that	children	accept	responsibility	for	the	negative	actions	of	their	ingroup	
members.		The	first	question	probed	which	group	children	thought	should	
apologise	for	the	damage	caused	to	the	victim’s	valued	possession.		In	answer	to	
this	question,	almost	all	children	said	that	the	group	whose	member	had	caused	
the	damage	ought	to	apologise,	suggesting	that	they	understood	which	group	the	
transgressor	belonged	to	and	were	able	to	answer	questions	about	group	level	
responsibility.		The	second	question	probed	whether	children	thought	that	they	
ought	to	try	to	repair	the	damage	caused	to	the	object	or	whether	a	member	of	
the	other	group	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	damage.		This	question	asked	about	
children’s	own	feelings	of	obligation	rather	than	those	of	the	group	more	
generally.		In	answer	to	this	question,	children	were	more	likely	to	say	that	they	
themselves	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	doll	when	a	member	of	their	own	group	
had	broken	it.		These	differences	were	observed	even	though	children	had	very	
little	experience	of	the	groups	to	which	they	had	been	assigned.		Thus,	although	
preschool-aged	children	likely	do	not	yet	experience	collective	responsibility	in	
its	adult	form	(Lickel	et	al.,	2004),	our	results,	taken	together	with	previous	
research	(Bennett	&	Sani,	2008),	do	suggest	that	the	origins	of	this	important	
social	phenomenon	are	present	by	5	years	of	age.	
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Further	analyses	showed	that	children’s	displays	of	guilt	were	positively	
associated	with	their	responses	on	the	two	explicit	questions	and	the	repair	
measure.		The	more	signs	of	guilt	children	displayed	after	the	doll	broke,	the	
more	signs	of	accepting	responsibility	they	subsequently	showed.		This	helps	
validate	our	coding	of	children’s	guilt	displays	and	provides	further	evidence	for	
the	association	between	experiencing	guilt	and	accepting	responsibility	for	a	
group	member’s	actions.		
It	is	important	to	note	that,	whereas	previous	research	has	shown	that	
guilt	and	accepting	responsibility	lead	to	increased	helping	behaviour	in	both	
adults	and	children	(de	Hooge,	et	al.,	2007;	Ketelaar	&	Au,	2003;	Vaish,	et	al.,	in	
press),	when	this	measure	was	analysed	in	isolation,	children	were	no	more	
likely	to	actively	attempt	to	repair	the	doll	when	it	was	broken	by	an	ingroup	
member.	There	are	a	number	of	possible	reasons	for	this.	One	possibility	is	that	
there	is	more	noise	in	this	measure	than	there	is	in	the	coding	of	children’s	non-
verbal	behaviour	and	the	explicit	questions.		Children	were	not	specifically	given	
permission	to	touch	or	repair	the	doll	during	the	30-second	repair	period,	so	the	
number	of	attempts	to	repair	might	have	been	influenced	by	their	relative	
shyness	or	impatience	with	the	pause	in	proceedings.	Another	possibility	is	that,	
as	this	measure	came	at	the	very	end,	some	children	in	the	Ingroup	condition	felt	
they	had	accepted	sufficient	responsibility	for	the	harm	by	the	time	they	were	
given	the	opportunity	to	repair	the	doll.	Along	these	lines,	previous	research	has	
demonstrated	that	once	children	have	expressed	remorse	verbally	or	attempted	
to	repair	the	harm	they	have	caused,	they	subsequently	engage	in	less	prosocial	
behaviour	towards	the	victim	(Vaish	et	al.,	in	press).		Alternatively,	children	who	
answered	that	they	themselves	ought	to	try	to	repair	the	doll,	as	approximately	
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half	of	children	did	in	the	Outgroup	condition,	may	have	felt	social	pressure	to	
act	in	line	with	their	earlier	response.		This	desire	to	be	consistent,	combined	
with	a	general	tendency	to	be	helpful	(Warneken	&	Tomasello,	2006),	may	have	
led	to	relatively	high	levels	of	helping	in	the	Outgroup	condition,	obscuring	any	
effect	of	the	manipulation.		
Like	all	studies,	our	work	has	a	number	of	limitations.	First,	we	presented	
the	explicit	questions	and	helping	measure	in	a	fixed	order.		It	is	thus	possible	
that	children’s	answer	to	the	first	question	(about	which	group	ought	to	
apologise	for	the	damage)	influenced	their	answer	to	the	second	question	(about	
who	ought	to	repair	the	doll)	by	making	them	more	likely	to	answer	in	line	with	
their	first	response.		It	is	also	possible,	as	mentioned	above,	that	children’s	
answers	to	the	two	explicit	questions	reduced	their	actual	tendency	to	try	to	
repair	the	doll.	In	future	research,	it	will	be	important	to	counterbalance	the	
order	of	both	of	the	verbal	questions	and	the	repair	measure	in	order	to	ensure	
that	they	do	not	differentially	influence	each	other.		
A	second	limitation	relates	to	how	we	measured	children’s	nonverbal	
displays	of	guilt	and	other	negative	emotions.	Research	on	social	emotions	has	
not	yet	established	specific	behavioural	markers	of	guilt	(Keltner	&	Buswell,	
1996).	As	a	result,	we	asked	two	independent	raters	for	their	overall	impression	
of	whether	children	appeared	to	feel	guilt.		This	technique	has	the	advantage	that	
it	taps	into	how	children’s	emotional	responses	might	be	perceived	by	others.		It	
is	not	without	its	weaknesses	however.	Due	to	inevitable	individual	differences	
in	emotion	perception,	the	inter-rater	reliability	between	our	two	coders	was	
relatively	low	and	we	cannot	determine	which	cues	the	raters	were	using	to	
make	their	decisions.		In	future	research,	it	will	be	important	to	develop	more	
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objective	ways	of	measuring	guilt,	perhaps	incorporating	physiological	measures	
such	as	pupil	dilation	in	order	to	obtain	more	reliable	information	(see,	e.g.,	
Hepach,	Vaish,	&	Tomasello,	in	press).	
Nevertheless,	this	work	opens	up	a	number	of	interesting	avenues	for	
future	research.		First,	it	would	be	interesting	to	investigate	the	relationship	
between	the	acceptance	of	collective	responsibility	and	intergroup	bias.		
Previous	research	has	shown	that	young	children	prefer	members	of	their	own	
group	to	members	of	other	groups,	recall	relatively	more	positive	information	
about	members	of	their	own	group,	and	interpret	their	ambiguous	actions	in	a	
more	positive	light	(e.g.,	Dunham,	Baron,	&	Banaji,	2008;	Dunham	et	al.,	2011;	
Kinzler	et	al.,	2007).		Further	research	could	investigate	the	situations	in	which	
children	excuse,	or	seek	to	minimise,	the	negative	actions	of	their	own	group	and	
the	situations	in	which	they	accept	responsibility	for	those	negative	actions.		
Related	to	this,	it	would	be	interesting	to	investigate	how	collective	
responsibility	relates	to	identification.	The	acceptance	of	collective	responsibility	
has	been	taken	as	evidence	of	young	children’s	subjective	identification	with	
their	social	groups	(Bennett	&	Sani,	2008;	Tomasello	et	al.,	2012).		However,	the	
relationship	between	the	strength	of	adults’	identification	and	their	acceptance	
of	collective	responsibility	is	complex	(Klein,	Licata,	&	Pierucci,	2011).		It	would	
be	interesting	to	look	at	how	the	strength	of	children’s	identification	predicts	
their	willingness	to	accept	collective	responsibility.		Finally,	it	would	be	
interesting	to	investigate	the	origins	of	other	collective	emotions.		Just	as	
children’s	connections	to	their	group	lead	them	to	accept	collective	
responsibility,	and	potentially	experience	guilt,	for	an	ingroup	member’s	
negative	actions,	it	may	lead	children	to	take	some	credit	for,	and	even	feel	pride	
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in,	an	ingroup	member’s	positive	actions.	Whether	positive	collective	emotions	
are	present	in	early	childhood,	and	what	social	functions	they	might	serve,	are	
fascinating	questions	for	future	work.		
	 Overall,	these	findings	add	to	a	growing	body	of	research	suggesting	that	
the	group	exerts	a	powerful	influence	over	cognition	and	behaviour	from	early	in	
development.		Even	infants	prefer	members	of	their	own	groups	to	members	of	
other	groups	(Kinzler	et	al.,	2007)	and,	later	in	development,	this	influences	
whom	children	choose	to	interact	with	and	learn	from	(e.g.,	Kinzler,	Corriveau,	&	
Harris,	2011).		Other	research	has	demonstrated	that,	at	least	by	the	age	of	five	
years,	children	categorise	themselves	as	belonging	to	particular	groups	and	that	
this	has	consequences	for	their	self-descriptions	(Sani	&	Bennett,	2009).		Here,	
we	extend	this	literature	by	demonstrating	that	children	show	the	origins	of	
collective	responsibility.		In	doing	so,	we	shed	fresh	light	on	one	of	the	group-
level	behaviours	that	is	integral	to	human	social	life.	
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